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Abstract: Criminal law exists in order to punish people for their culpable misconducts, whenever there is a
culpable wrong one should criminalize and punish. A distinctive moral voice: the criminal wrong that we don’t
find beyond is revealed and any normative ethical enquiry should point out, as a specific axiological and moral
category related to such evil conducts. Why not suppose an unconscious genesis of it in the sensitive faculties,
because there is a constitution of what man is, learned through history?
Eduard von Hartmann thinks that the normative role of self-control functions in different moral principles. This
is valid also in criminal ethics. Thinking the process what begins to be morally relevant, as morally criminal is
presented as “ruse of the conscious will”: pre ethically, by specific psychological drives, and metaphysically by
character formation.
Keywords: Pessimism, punishment, unconscious.
Resumo: Leis criminais existem para punir pessoas de acordo com suas infrações, quando há um culpado errado
alguém deveria ser criminalizado e punido. Uma distintiva voz moral: o erro criminal que nós não encontramos
além é revelado e qualquer investigação ética normativa o deveria mostrar, conforme uma específica categoria
axiológica e moral relacionadas a tais más condutas. Por que não supor uma gênese inconsciente nas faculdades
sensíveis, por que há uma constituição do que o homem é, ensinada através da história?
Edward von Hartmann pensa que o papel normativo das funções de autocontrole acontece através de diferentes
princípios morais. Isto é válido também em crimes éticos. Pensando o processo que começa a ser moralmente
relevante, o criminoso é moralmente apresentado como “artimanha da vontade consciente”: pré eticamente, por
específicos intintos psicológicos e, metafisicamente, pela formação do caráter.    
Palavras-chave: Pessimismo, punição, inconsciente.
Introduction
Among Schopenhauerian philosophers as Philipp Mainländer, Julius Bahnsen and Eduard von
Hartmann,  we  find  various  original  critical  reflections  on  the  unconscious  will  and  different
evaluations of the role and meaning of suffering in human existence1. E. von Hartmann (1842 1906),‒
in particular, has an underappreciated influence on the history of phenomenology, as part of normative
ethics,  in  establishing  the  pertinence  of  a  historical  method  for  psychological  observations.  His
remarkably rich concern with the origins of the unconscious mental life received and is still scrutinized
1 See MÜLLER-SEYFARTH, 1993 and 2008; see REGINSTER, 2006.
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by  contemporary  literature2.  The  author  of  the  “Philosophy  of  the  Unconscious”  addresses  the
philosophical interrogation of the utility of history for life, showing how moral psychology should be
seen  as  combining  evolutionism  with  axiology  or  eudemonism3.  We  find  in  von  Hartmann’s
Phänomenologie (1879), and later in: „Die Axiologie und ihre Gliederung“ (1890) and in: “Ethik und
Eudämonismus” (1898), the central  idea that the capacities for suffering and sympathy have to be
interpreted on the historical line of the genesis of the notion of the unconscious, and should be assessed
according two criteria. It doesn’t follow from an antinomy between the moral sentiments, as the point
of view of the ethics of prudence (Glückseligkeit), and ethical life (Sittlichkeit) that this antinomy has
the dissolution of eudemonistic axiology for implication. A foundation of the morals in eudemonistic
ethics on the basis of pessimism and the lack of ethical ideal as an absolute personality don’t suggest a
wrong foundation of happiness, as an ethical claim on its nature we believe, and we shall see how von
Hartmann  structures  on  different  levels  his  principles  of  moral  sentiments,  and  other  teleological
guidelines4. It is important to notice that the polarity of the will and the reason is as essential to von
Hartmann’s moral philosophy, as the preconceived aim of a negative evaluation of existence. While
this later thesis affirms that the presence of evil in the universe takes us to the very heart of all the
other problems of life, the former claims that we share (with some non-human animals) an important
part of our participation in the actualization of the will, in an “ursprünglichen Naivität” expressed by
our sympathy. We should notice that sympathy is a mixed feeling for von Hartmann, who adds critical
observations to Schopenhauer’s views on compassion, confronting this notion with the production of a
2 See JENSEN, 2012; WOLF, 2006. The strong impact on the history of the notion of the unconscious, and the direct
relation to Nietzsche, regarding normative ethics, is worth to mention, see: JENSEN, Anthony (2012): „Das Unbewusste
durch die Historie enthüllt: der bejahende Einfluss Hartmanns auf Nietzsche“, in: Nietzsches Philosophie des Unbewussten,
Ed. by Georg, Jutta/ Zittel, Claus, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter Verl., 157. We let open the question how far von Hartmann
(and before him Schopenhauer) borrows some of his most important arguments to Schelling, reproducing them in a much
more systematic manner, in the field of the philosophy of nature, metaphysics, psychology, religion, ethics or aesthetics.
This is true, in particular, concerning the principle of an unconscious mental power of the transcendental Anschauung, in
Schelling’s first period, and is also relevant concerning the duplicity of the orientation of the will, from the second period,
as hedonism and asceticism. See: E. von Hartmann (1900), Geschichte der Metaphysik, Zweiter Teil, Ausgewählte Werke
Vol. 12, Leipzig: Hermann Haacke, 169, 171, 175. See also: Hühn, Lore (2006):  Die Ethik Arthur Schopenhauers im
Ausgang von Deutschen Idealismus (Fichte/Schelling), Würzburg: Ergon Verl., 11-20.
3 The idea of negative eudemonism, of happiness attainable through negation and opposed to absolute eudemonism, is a
doctrine  which  is  showing pessimism with  regard  to  the  value  of  life,  according  to  the  norm of  happiness.  A fuller
interpretation of this idea, applied on the practical issues of blame, as prevention and retribution, can be found, for example,
in the first part of: HAAZ, Ignace (2012): La solidarité chez Hegel, von Hartmann, Tocqueville et Mill, Coll. Commentaires
philosophiques, Paris: Éditions L’Harmattan, 7-212. I am grateful to Prof. A. Duff and A. von Hirsch for inviting me to
discuss von Hartmann’s views regarding criminalization at the  Special Workshop on Criminalization, at the IVR World
Congress in Frankfurt, the 16-18 August 2011.
4 The normative relations between happiness and the problem of evil qua pessimism are the center of a lifelong enquiry .
Dissertations in normative ethics include: HARTMANN, Eduard von (1879): Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins:
Prolegomena  zu  jeder  künftigen  Ethik,  Berlin:  C.  Dunker  Verlag;  (1890):  „Die  Axiologie  und ihre  Gliederung“,  Zur
Geschichte und Begründung des Pessimismus, A.I, Leipzig: Hermann Haacke Verl., 1-17. See in particular here for the
coherence of this approach: (1898): “Ethik und Eudämonismus” in : Ethische Studien, Siebente Aufsatz, Leipzig: Hermann
Haacke, 160, 174.
Criminalization and self-control as “ruse of the conscious will” for Eduard von Hartmann                                                                     123
IGNACE HAAZ
subtle illusion, by a suspect pleasure of “Grausamkeitswollust5”. From that pre-teleological view, we
are  linked  to  the  domain  of  the  ethics  of  the  moral  sentiments.  Without  introducing  a  collective
teleological aim of history, we would have to admit the punctual and exceptional character of moral
virtuosity, in certain individual asceticism and outstanding human realizations with Schopenhauer or
Mainländer  in  a  quasi-Buddhist  attitude6.  This  world view can be the  logical  consequence  of  the
following analysis, related to our specific conception of vitalism as cosmological, political or religious
set of arguments. A way of understanding the Schopenhauerian unconscious will is to consider the will
without the teleological aspects related to our perception of the world as a whole with Mainländer
(1886).  But we could say that we don’t see how such a simplification with Mainländer can give a
structured religious or ethical meaning to a philosophy of redemption, as the overcoming in a new start
the  suffering  of  punishment.  Interpreting  redemption  as  psychological  desperation  cannot  directly
explain a possible unity on the higher level of teleology. Let’s present Mainländer’s reduction of all
pantheistic will as a whole, in the world, to a supra-individual, but blind and aimless willing: the will
to live “Wille zum Leben”, and see on this level various possible propositions. We could be focusing
on a will to will, a second order desire, since it is a desire to desire not a desire for determinate objects
(e. g. food, a pen, walking in a garden). On this line human life seems to “swing” “between pain and
boredom”7. This will to life has a plausible cosmological and not religious alternative with Nietzsche’s
will to power: if the will to live does not exist, only: “where there is life is there also will: not will to
life but – thus I teach you – will to power” (Thus Spoke Zarathustra, II, 12). Interestingly, this will to
power  sees  the wish to  preserve oneself  as  “the  symptom of  a  condition  of  distress”,  that’s  why
Mainländer’s Spinozist or Darwinist reduction of the will as a whole, to a kind of self-preservation of
life, and his solution of the individual “will to die” (Wille zum Tode), should be seen as a limitation of
the really  fundamental instinct  of life as the expansion of power with Nietzsche (see  The Will  to
Power,  688).  If  not  “the  joy  of  the  circle”  itself  as  a  goal,  becoming  as  self-creation  turns  to
self-destruction  because  as  willing  creatures  we  cannot  help  having  determinate  desires,  and  in
consequence we cannot complain that we have nothing to desire. On the contrary, in certain situations,
we want to do something but are frustrated and bored not to be in the position to do (for example in
jail).
5 See for more critical materials on this topic:  WOLF, Jean-Claude (2006):  Eduard von Hartmann.  Ein Philosoph der
Gründerzeit, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 32-33.
6 Mainländer keeps the Schopenhauerian unconscious will without the teleological aspects related to our perception of the
world as a whole: “der Pantheismus des Herrn von Hartmann aber steht in unserer Zeit da, wie ein Kinderschuh in der
Garderobe eines Mannes, d.h. in romantischer Weise“. MAINLÄNDER, Philipp (1886/2011): „Kritik der Hartmann'schen
Philosophie des Unbewußten“, Philosophie der Erlösung, 2. Band, 532, 537-8.
7 See WOLF 2006, 24-25; REGINSTER 2006, 122-5.
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 By  opposition  to  Schopenhauer  Hartmann  thinks  that,  if  suffering  and  sympathy  are  as
important as rationality, in determining what to treat as an end in itself, Schopenhauer’s (negative)
eudemonistic view can be interpreted in a way which does not banish all plurality of individuals, in a
collective  deliverance  from  evil.  This  self-overcoming  is  the  manifestation  of  the  unconscious,
unfolding not  only a  functional  channel  of  self-realization of  the  character8 but  also the  ethically
altruistic  interpretation  of  redemption  as  a  collective  gesture9.  Both  evolution  and  negative
eudemonism are not supposed to be contradictory. Following together religious, cosmic and simply
political vitalism, the streams of unconscious life is not as much seen as splitting in various lifestyles,
but in contrast it is conceived as building the concrete whole of existence, a bridge in relation to each
individual10. Since it is necessary for human beings to follow any kind of finality, one cannot live
without  an ideal.  Therefore the teleological  view of evolutionistic  optimism and the eudemonistic
pessimism forms a unity for von Hartmann, following Schelling’s positive philosophy, and summing
up criticism of Hegel and Schopenhauer. This harmony is not a fusion of the idea and the will, two
different principles inadequate in isolation, but the presentation of the condition of the decision of the
will,  under external or under self-imposed laws.  In fact, a descriptive and historical point of view
found in von Hartmann’s work should be considered as an excellent starting point to reflect not only
on  a  possible  Neokantian  foundation  of  normative  ethics  in  phenomenology  in  the  footsteps  of
Schopenhauer, Hegel and Schelling. Our concern will be to see how any particular kind of morality, as
for example the evil  of punishment,  can be interpreted on the collective basis  of von Hartmann’s
axiology, or at least, how the unconscious drive involved in retribution should not be interpreted. We
shall try to apply von Hartmann’s radical contribution to ethics to the question of criminalization11. As
realizing the moral grounds related to the experience of suffering, we shall explore a diachronic point
of view, not only on the question of a just reward or retribution, but more essentially we shall enter the
realm of ethical normativity as an immoralist in the qualified sense, namely putting in perspective as
historical evaluation a variety of conceptions of (heteronomous) morality, without rejecting genuine
morality. This collective view of all feelings in the realization of the moral of sentiments is opposed to
a  single  homogenous  principle,  and  describes  emotions  of  which  every  one  engenders  a  moral
8 See DARNOI, 1967.
9 For an introduction on Hartmann’s absolute moral principle, see also the notion of an unconscious God as postulate of his
social quietism and escapism, cf. WOLF, J.-C. (2012): “Der Unbewusste Gott nach Eduard von Hartmann”, in: Nietzsches
Philosophie des Unbewussten, Ed. by Georg, Jutta/ Zittel, Claus, 31 ff. On the moral and psychological ground of the
character,  see:  Darnoi,  Dennis  N.  Kenedy  (1967):  The  unconscious  and  Eduard  von  Hartmann.  A historico-critical
monograph, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 113.
10 For an example of how the philosophy of the unconscious and vitalism can be considered as basis of Buddhism, see
Takeda, Sumio (2012): “Vitalism and Kegon Buddhism”, New Nietzsche Studies, Vol. 8, No 3-4, 73.
11 The metaphysical position of E. v. Hartmann in the history of metaphysics is related to Plotin, Spinoza, Kant, Schelling,
Hegel and Schopenhauer, just to name the more famous.
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principle (e. g. self-feeling as principle, but also remorse, etc.) Most of the immoralistic egoistical
self-determinations can be seen as eudemonistic outlooks (and some perhaps as morale aristocratique
à la Nietzsche), or as the antiauthoritarian solipsism (à la Stirner), if they qualify as growing stages of a
higher moral principle, as self-legislation of practical reason. On this line the carriers of the moral
principle of reason should  in fine incorporate the moral principles of truth, the aspects of freedom,
equality, order and justice for von Hartmann, and should attain maturity in consciousness, as the fullest
consummation of the synthesis of the unconscious, in the entire process of evolution. If a study in the
field of normative ethics is concerned by the problem of evil, following von Hartmann it is worthy to
ask how this question applies in criminal law ethics, in particular also because von Hartmann was
informed by the works of legal philosophers as A. Lasson (1882) and J. Stahl (1830-1837). Following
von Hartmann, the classical problem of evil converges with the confrontation with an extramoral or
premoral  period  of  human  history,  as  we  find  for  instance  in  the  second  evil  of  punishment,  in
particular  when  retribution,  as  normative  method,  could  be  interpreted  as  having  the  optimistic
intention of eradicating a first evil12.
A critical objection to a historical reflection arises; we are concerned by a very practical and
concrete issue in criminal ethics:  does a State-sanctioned punishment involve a moral reproach of
guilt,  and  a  will  of  control  of  a  first  evil,  and  if  it  does,  how far  is  it  not  contra  productive  as
heteronomous stage? If we don’t agree with the necessity of a heteronomous remorse based principle,
on  which  basis  could  we  justify  punishment,  according  to  a  concept  that  views  the  object  of
criminalization based on a criterion of self-control, without having to fall in a moralizing intention, or
having to deny the meaning of morals as such? We will define criminalization and punishment in a
broader sense, according to the impact of normative history on human life, and interpret A. Duff’s
account of legal moralism, in a way to rehabilitate morality in the realm of criminal ethics, but cum
grano sali: without denying to the immoralist the force of challenging ours conceptions of morality,
and to focus directly on our impulse to respond to the evil by a second evil.  By the mean of his
postulate of a unconscious synthesis, we shall follow von Hartmann’s transformation of the Cartesian
ergo sum in its contrary, namely that the unconscious material of our perception is the starting point of
our  psychology  of  the  mind,  building  our  conception  of  the  legality,  and  of  individual
self-determination  and  freedom.  On  our  lecture  of  legal  moralism,  the  unconscious  grows,  once
admitted  in  the  conscious  awareness,  as  the  dog,  that  Faust  once  had  let  enter,  so  that  clear
intentionality should give some place in the room.
12 If it was the case, then punishing would imply the will of “exorcising” devils “by Beelzebub” as Wolf puts it. It would be
a deformation of the ethical and moral normativity of punishment, for the sake of an ideology of punishment; and we find
the same misuse in the just war doctrine. See WOLF, Jean-Claude (2011) “Krieg gegen Böse, der Fanatismus der Tugend“,
in: Das Böse, Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 131.
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According to the dogmatic approach, a person accused of a crime should be taken seriously as a
person and not seen as a sleepwalker or a small child. He is expected to show concern if he is the
object of moral reproach, recognizing a primary function to conscious intentionality, according a prima
facie  identification of consciousness and being.  Before discussing the idea if  self-control is  really
decisive  for  understanding  criminalization,  let  us  first  take  an  example  of  how  looking  at
consciousness as unproductive in the absolute changes our philosophical thinking of normative ethics
and criminalization. Let’s look at the question whether the reproach of guilt should lead to remorse. If
that were the case punishment could imply guilt, because assuming responsibility for a tort could lead
to an expression of irritation towards one's self,  because of a lack of control of a specific type of
behaviour. We would make, on this line, the assumption that certain means for reconciling with society
could be found in remorse, and in determining the extent of punishment. According to von Hartmann,
although  remorse  has  a  role  in  developing  criminal  norms,  it  should  be  considered  normatively
inapplicable. Is that to be understood in a strong immoralistic way, as the affirmation that we should
not only ignore the morality of remorse, as a kind of vis inertiae, but claim that morality, as such, is a
bad thing that should be rejected as a negative faculty of repression?
Hartmann seems close to the opinion according to which a victim forms an element of the idea
of  tort,  that  he  has  suffered,  and  that  the  State  can  assess  a  degree  of  shared  responsibility  in
behaviours, in the same way that any person reacts in dealing with a constraint. Our evaluation of
remorse should not be read as a camouflage, where we are missing what is taking place when we
merely read the words: “torts”, “remorse” and “culpability”. There is a  substantial  description of a
criminal tort, on the basis of the opinion that there is a distinct qualitative experience between two or
several wills in any conflict13. We shall try to find confirmation that Hartmann describes the authority
to whom we are responsible for a tort, when a community-based legal censure is imposed through
conflicting wills and not only a sanction of morals. In his study of retribution, Hartmann states that an
object of criminalization can consist in showing how retribution is transferred to the entire political
community, in accordance with responsibility shared by the entire community. But then, how can von
Hartmann not reinforce the feeling that violence must be turned against the blamed brutes, through a
kind of moral terrorism? We shall look at the notion of retribution from the point of view of penal
norms inspired by Hartmann's philosophy of the unconscious, and several extracts of his treatise on
ethics, which has drawn little attention.
13 See HARTMANN, Eduard von (1869/1889): “Die Entstehung des Bewusstseins”, Philosophie des Unbewussten (Part 2,
chapter III.1,  tenth revised edition in three parts),  Leipzig:  Verlag von Wilhelm Friedrich,  38;  in the English transl.  :
Philosophy of the Unconscious (1893), by W. C. Coupland, vol. 2, London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, & Co. Ltd, 88.
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1. To feel responsible for something: the ethical sentiment, the point of view of the character and
intellectual understanding of remorse
Conflict resolution requires that an individual suspected of having committed a tort seeks to
reconcile  with  the  rest  of  society  through  expression  of  remorse,  otherwise  his  reintegration  is
impossible. Hartmann believes, however, that independently from the question of its expression, the
very experience of a “reinforcement of remorse” “should overall be rejected and be advisedly limited
where appropriated elements of an autonomous ethics are available, whether as taste, moral sentiment
or reason14” on the basis of existing feelings of one's self can be comforted, in order to strengthen one's
ethical life.
In  order  to  describe  specific  disadvantages  of  remorse  from  the  perspective  of  moral
psychology, I shall first point an ambiguity in the notion of satisfaction based on the negative character
of pleasure or happiness. Since satisfaction is not understood as securing the possession of the object
of one’s desire, but as the possession, it doesn’t comes to us sui generis, but as deliverance form a pain,
i.e. from a need for an object. Therefore there is no positive benefit to possessing this object beyond
the elimination of the need for it15.  Because feelings differ depending on the ethical quality of an
action, but is related to the victory of a momentary dominant desire, experienced by a criminal, a
pleasure  or  a  triumph,  in  function  of  the  will  adopted,  which  could  be  compared  to  the  feeling
experienced by a charitable nun in saving a human life, remarks comically v. Hartmann. It is only after
that desire has diminished that correct evaluation and correction of errors are possible,  and that a
reproachable attitude or a previously unknown context creates clear awareness. When an error has a
favourable effect, the unexpected benefits are welcome, but when it has an unfavourable effect, there is
irritation at the lack of attention and commitment towards the goal considered to be correct. Self-love
plays a role as intellectual stimulant against the irritation of the error, but only rarely does it have the
final word, “because over time impartial comprehension does not allow the telling of tales16”. Whoever
is thus involved would be in desperation because he is “unable to undo what he has done 17”. Neither
consciousness of the person charged as guilty of an incorrect action nor remorse in the strict sense is,
however,  the  only  way  for  this  duplication  of  the  self  to  occur,  as  Schopenhauer  remarked18.
14 HARTMANN,  Eduard  von  (1879):  “Das  Prinzip  des  moralischen  Nachgefühls”,  Phänomenologie  des  sittlichen
Bewusstseins: Prolegomena zu jeder künftigen Ethik, Sektion 2, A.II.3, Berlin: C. Dunker Verlag, 194-195; (henceforth
PsB). This point of view is still to be compared from the viewpoints of Spinoza and de Montaigne.
15 See SCHOPENHAUER, Arthur (1873/1977): Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, I, §58, Zürich: Diogenes Verlag, 399.
See also: Reginster, Bernard (2006): The Affirmation of Life, Harvard, UP, 115.
16 “Das Prinzip des moralischen Nachgefühls”, PsB, Section 2, A.II.3, 184.
17 PsB, 184 185.‒
18 See SCHOPENHAUER, A. (1841/1995): On the Basis of Morality, §9. See also: KANT, E. (1797/1994): Metaphysics of
Morals II, I.I, § 13.
Criminalization and self-control as “ruse of the conscious will” for Eduard von Hartmann                                                                     128
Revista Voluntas: Estudos sobre Schopenhauer - Vol. 3, Números 1 e 2 - 1º e 2º semestres de 2012 - ISSN: 2179-3786 - pp. 122-142.
Interestingly, Hartmann follows him in rejecting the thesis of a moral conscience, where we would be
both accuser and judge and where we would thus be at a disadvantage before that tribunal, in a sort of
“legal drama” in order to defend the argument according to which self-duplication is something that is
not essential to the conscience. It would be best to identify “a conflict of contrasting motives19”. Within
the framework of contrasting motives, ethical remorse greatly resembles egoistical remorse or purely
natural remorse. Egoistical remorse is described as pseudo-ethical intellectual thinking about what can
raise one's individual happiness, after an omission, while natural remorse is relegated to the study of
the character as a psychological factum. One might highlight, from a dogmatic point of view, that
being guilt prone should be seen in a positive sense of having a great sense of responsibility for others,
by being aware of our own past mistakes, without meaning that persons are perpetually feeling guilty
for things that they haven’t done. On this line, shame would be linked to low self-esteem, a negative
judgement  on the  whole self,  whereas  guilt  is  a  negative evaluation  of  a  particular  action,  which
appears  positive on this  contrasting  ground with the  notion of  shame or  self-esteem as  a  totality.
According to Hartmann, in seeking to stress the interest of remorse, its defenders have a tendency to
attribute  an  ethical  element  to  non-ethical  characteristics,  thus  creating  obstacles  to  ethics20.  All
remorse reposes on a desire contrary to experience of possessing the capacity to undo what has been
done and on the pain caused by the impossibility of that happening. By raising remorse to a condition
sine qua non, or by recognizing it as only an important instrumental value in order to live an ethical
life, we lose access to an ethical life, or see the hope of its realisation decrease, as soon as reason
registers this characteristic. (Pseudo-) ethical remorse “depresses the felling of one's self”, decreases
ethical force, by weakening confidence in that same feeling, and “leads to ethical impotence and to
helplessness by sustained repetition along an ascending line21”. The benefit of remorse is not to be
excluded in the case of an incarcerated criminal, suggesting that all ethical consideration of remorse
should not be suppressed, but even in that case benefits would be difficult to measure22. Von Hartmann
is demonstrating the socio-moral function of moral principles based on self-esteem, while deflating the
legal  moralists’ pretensions  to  having grasped the real  way human being engage with remorse in
generalizing the experience of punishment, he concludes:
Most of us, who are today neither convicts nor brutal savages but have had for the
most  part  the  chance  to  enter  life  as  adults  with  an  aware  and  active  ethical
19 On the Basis of Morality, §9.
20 “Das Prinzip des moralischen Nachgefühls”, PsB, Section 2, A.II.3, p. 194.
21 “Das Prinzip des moralischen Nachgefühls”,  PsB, Section 2, A.II.3, p. 194.  See also my own analysis of shame and
blame, cf. Haaz, La solidarité, 21-31, 39, 44, 47.
22 See “Das Prinzip des moralischen Nachgefühls”, PsB, Section 2, A.II.3, p. 195.
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conscience, we want to be educated through other means and have other means for
gaining knowledge and be stimulated for an ethical life [than remorse]23.
If the ethical conviction of being one's own end, the principle of autonomy is an important
conviction,  then  remorse  could  still  be  a  means  of  forming human qualities.  The positive  ethical
sentiment  of  one's  self,  in  one's  own  dignity,  should  correspond  to  a  full,  loyal  and  benevolent
humanity, but Hartmann raises the question ironically24:
What could go beyond the proud conscience of the self of my ethical conviction, when
that ethical conviction is a purpose in itself and the very purpose of my life? Ethical
taste  is  already  protesting  against  that,  in  other  words,  ethical  judgement  not  yet
conscious of its basis. Making that the essence of ethical conviction, which can be
cultivated only as inner life, inevitably carries a type of moral egoism, in other words
the tendency to sufficiency at any cost25.
A stronger way to understand respect and human dignity would be to develop the difference
between a concentration and an expansion of feelings, but not by keeping the sole teleological point of
view of the first26. This line of material ethical reasoning mirrors the way of thought which distances
Hartmann  (and  Nietzsche)  from  Darwin  and  Hegel.  To  follow  the  historical  function  of  moral
psychology, and to envision the incorporation of commitment of individual will in the community,
favouring a pessimistic eudemonia, should not stray from the diversity of men against teleological
hegemony, restoring the innocence of becoming in the disengagement with teleology27. Let us now see
this  evaluation of self-control,  as an important  instrument  of  ethical  life  in  community where the
teleological significance of life is as important as the innocent play of the child or the Buddhist blissful
ignorance of the evil28.  This proviso is central when we come to the question whether self-control
should be seen as the corner stone in the normativity of criminalization, since the immersion in the
experience of the subjectivity as a whole should incorporate something chaotic, Nietzsche would say
the infinitude of the ocean29. The solitary laughing and swinging innocent play of the thinking faculty
for Nietzsche keeps distance from the world, and as will to power, chooses the way the will can come
23 PsB, Section 2, A.II.3, p. 196.
24 I  take  inspiration  from  Stoecker's  systematic  thoughts  on  dignity.   See  STOECKER,  R.  (Ed.):  Menschenwürde  –
Annäherung an einen Begriff, Vienna, 2003.
25 “Das Prinzip des moralischen Selbstgefühls”, PsB, Section 2, A.II.2, p. 181.
26 PsB, Section 2, A.II.2, p. 182.
27 See  HARTMANN,  Eduard  von  (1896/1900):  “Sozialdemokratie  und  Anarchismus  als  Abspaltungen  aus  dem
Liberalismus”, Zur Zeitgeschichte: neue Tagesfragen, Leipzig: Hermann Haacke, 86 88 and 94 95.‒ ‒
28 Baumann  already  formulated  the  thought  that  self-control  should  be  seen  as  the  proper  aim  of  punishment.   See
Baumann,  Johann  Julius  (1879):  “Das  Recht  überwiegend  von  Seiten  der  Gemeinschaft  betrachtet”,  Abriss  der
Rechtsphilosophie, Leipzig: Verlag von S. Hirzel, §59, pp. 433 and 434.
29 Cf. NIETZSCHE, F. “Von alten und neuen Tafeln“, Zarathustra, III, 12, 255. Nietzsche, F. (1884/1999):  Also sprach
Zarathustra, Werke, Kritische Studienausgabe, Hrsg. G. Colli und M. Montinari, Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 4, III, 12, 255.
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back  to  the  world,  before  restarting  this  circle.  It  reminds  a  possible  interpretation  of  the
Schopenhauerian will to live, and because it supposes a circle, and the return of the same content, as
explained by von Hartmann (189830), it can be considered as an antidote against pessimism, or on the
contrary, as a superficial first impression “oberflächlichen Vordergrunds Ansicht”, it is the point of
view of the blind and irrational will, instead of being the acceptation of the voice of reason. It is hard
to say, it depends on our understanding of the problem of evil and pessimism.
2. Answering for a crime: observations of an ethical evolutionist in countering the argument of
self-control of legal moralism
From a dogmatic point of view, for the category of restrictions based on morally incorrect
behaviour regulated by law, it seems that there are few obstacles to application of a sort of genealogy
of blame as stated by Spinoza, and we may extend the materiality of the tort to legal regulations31. To
be responsible, in other words to be in a position to answer, is based on a relational description of
self-control described by legal moralism, that we can compare with Hartmann's observations based on
metaphysical  monism  and  ethical  evolutionism.  The  penal  ethics  of  Duff's  contemporary  legal
moralism allows us to focus on the conditions of criminal responsibility, namely on the object of the
criminalization strictly speaking, from the point of view of a legal moralist. Should we simply keep
that sort of thought experiment, having an exclusive use of teleological thinking, or should we say that
life is and will always be a problem, and that we cannot understand what is about ourselves which
contains our high (but morally and legally obedient) possibilities. Hartmann describes conditions that
would  be  impossible  to  categorize  as  rational  self-control,  because  they  are  linked  to  coherent
processes of behaviour but do not answer to the principle of reality, in a teleological agenda, usurping
the spontaneity of our instincts. He stresses that certain types of self-control are anarchical, to the
extent that an idée fixe and/or an obsession determine centrifugal egoistical tendencies, but starting
from an individual purpose of lower order, without the misguided aims of forcing the ends we want.
Thus, to trick someone, to pretend or to hide one's true intentions require an obvious self-control. A
rational criterion of self-control implies taking into account part of a set of norms of taste and moral
sentiments, and not only a subspecies of the principles of ethical freedom in the species of rational
moral  principles,  because  subjective  ethics  is  a  comprehensive  totality  for  Hartmann32.  If  an
30 HARTMANN, Eduard von (1898): „Nietzsches „Neue Moral““, in: Ethische Studien, II, 57-59.
31 SPINOZA, Baruch (1677/1985): Ethics, III, P.XXIX, scholie.
32 HARTMANN,  Eduard  von  (1869/1889):  Preface  to  the  second  edition,  No.  53  (p.  134),  “Charakter  und  Wille”,
Philosophie des Unbewussten, Tenth edition, Third part, First volume, V, p. 142.
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intellectual dimension is necessary in order to enlighten individual will, a large set of reasons that
allow mobilization of will in a decision are presented by the German philosopher.
According to Duff, self-control could be an ideal candidate for a normative description that
specifies the object of a criminal prohibition as opposed to reasons for punishment, which would not
be limited to behaviour that would require censure within a community. It would even be possible to
moralize legally behaviours for which there is no established moral tort, if we admit as evident that
each person should maintain control over certain actions when confronted with a source dictating rules
of  good  conduct.  In  contemporary  theory,  Duff  stresses  the  component  of  intentionality  of
criminalization and blame in trying to include legal prohibitions created from artificial  regulations
incorporated into laws. In that way, non-conformity with a regulation should be criminalized, with the
condition that there are moral torts of a type that merits public censure and punishment33. It can occur
that a legal regulation exists in the form of an administrative sanction with a penalty and not with a
penal sanction, a situation that allows criminalization of a behaviour sanctioned by an administrative
instance, which is already subject to a legal sanction before being criminalized. Identification of an
intentional object of penal responsibility can occur without a plan for quantification of punishment. In
contrast, to ask how long a punishment should be, for example until expiation of a wrong or reinsertion
in a human community, assumes an established difference between conditions of responsibility, and
the object for which a person is held criminally responsible.
In contrast to a rather dogmatic legal moralism, Hartmann argues for levels of balance after
adoption of ethical principles, and like Hume he tends to see the basis for responsibility in character
rather  than  in  rational  choice34.  This  orientation  does  not  seem to  justify  stressing  the  object  of
criminalization. It gives instead a temporizing and a quantity through presentation of the purpose of
rehabilitating certain criminals in a legal order, by guaranteeing their best possible status. Contrary to
Hume, however, who sees punishment not so much as a question of criminal responsibility but rather
than of utility, in other words as rules linked to a given public end, Hartmann's ethics give a relational
touch  to  what  he  calls  “true  principles  of  ethical  life”.  That  includes,  moral  principles  of  duty,
retribution,  legality  and  justice,  thus  placing  the  question  of  responsibility  towards  others  in  the
foreground35. This affirmation requires, however, important nuances concerning the way used to define
criteria for someone assuming responsibility for something. In a way that seems rather analogous to
the  unconscious  character  of  Hartmann's  historical  process,  Duff’s  legal  moralism  supposes  that
33 See DUFF, R. Antony (2007): Answering for Crime, Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, pp. 82 and 91. See also Moore,
Michael (1997): Placing Blame, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 662.
34 See:  HAAZ,  Ignace  (2009):  „L’invention  des  conventions  de  justice  chez  Hume“,  in:  L’invention  philosophique
humienne, Philippe Saltel (dir.), Grenoble : Université Pierre Mendès France, 233, 243, 268-272.
35 See  „Das  Moralprinzipien  des  Gegengefühls“,  „Das  Moralprinzipien  des  Pflichtgefühls“,  „Das  Moralprinzipien  der
Rechtlichkeit und Gerechtigkeit“, PsB, Section 2, A.II.4, 10, and A.III.8.
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epistemic conditions, in other words those about which a person should be aware, concern first of all
not one's responsibility but rather rules of liability. Thus, rules can be recognized as non-applicable
under  certain  conditions  of  justification  and  excuse.  On  the  other  hand,  a  responsibility  remains
established at various levels in a society among its members, because each member can be held to
conditions of self-control36. This condition of control of behaviour is an assumed reciprocal norm, in
an  agreement  shared  among  citizens,  in  order  to  ensure  pacific  coexistence  in  society.  However,
control of others raises questions,  for example when certain behaviour is discovered only through
police  investigation,  and  which  would  have  gone  unnoticed  without  its  action.  Which  degree  of
reciprocal  responsibility  should  each  member  of  a  community  take  on,  and  expect  from others,
knowing that limits must be recognizable, when faced with an unjustifiable intrusion into everyone's
private life? A condition of rather broad self-control takes on a form of normative responsibility to the
same extent, because although in fact I can hold someone responsible prima facie for an action, which
I feel that person should have been able to do, I cannot demand that a person be recognized responsible
for conditions of an action, that I admit he could not control. One specific aspect of a sociable human
being is to be able to enforce the requirement of controlling an action, when confronted with a negative
freedom; in other words not limiting another person unjustifiably.  In order to limit the normative
nature and not the logical nature of this control, this criterion requires that control of behaviour be
made under reasonable terms. As a consequence, a strong presumption exists in favour of a person
with self-control, through a framework of reasonable limits, who ends up refusing to take into account
previous intervals of time in self-determination, which weakens that specific control. We can exercise
our control over various movements of the body, and we are supposed to master our thoughts, our
emotions and our character, but there is rather little sense in evoking a criminal responsibility given a
very broad range of states of mind, although all these dimensions of the human psyche contribute to
rational self-control.  Two types of observations are proposed by Hartmann’s evolutionist ethics, in
favour of  a  rather  broad approach of  criminal  responsibility,  where self-control  is  not  seen  as  an
unconscious historical process, but grounded on a rather thick epistemic level37.
Self-control  presented by legal  moralism as  a  condition of  responsibility  supposes  that  the
striving for goals and aims are essential to adult life. Once the urgency of the imperative to experience
pointless meanings, discontinuous non teleological experiences, along with growing up in a series of
continuous transformation, we come to the evidence that there is no moral principle of self-control.
The requirement of control is only “a condition for a sound ethical life and conscious of itself”, as
36 See DUFF, Answering for Crime, p. 16.
37 See DUFF, Answering for Crime, pp. 57, 60 and 62.
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Hartmann calls it38. Legal moralism adds a criterion of rationality in a rational normative situation, but
it should be kept in mind that there are non-rational situations of self-control and the very norms of
self-control  could  be  questioned  in  terms  of  evolutionary  psychology.  The  creative  part  of  the
organization of life eludes rational productive appropriation. Self-control is a condition for my ethical
existence and is a stage of psychological development of my own understanding of myself, without
constituting a full normative ethical principle. If I consider self-control, I immediately have to consider
also  the  creative  part  of  the  self,  in  a  blissful  energy,  a  first  movement,  a  sacred  yes,  supposing
blindness between past and future goals, as would do the spontaneous play of the child.
For Hartmann, whenever an individual shows self-control, he overcomes the rest of his reasons
for action in order to pursue a  conscious goal  consequently,  whether  rational,  irrational,  moral or
immoral. In contrast to Duff, Hartmann defends a strong epistemic criterion, and so he mirrors the
mute  experience  of  unconscious  immersion  in  life.  When  we  view self-control  purely  negatively
through conflicting motives, the content of an activity still has to possess a determinate value, which is
independent of the fact that it involves specific motives, let’s say for example because they would be
difficult to achieve,  and not as first  order desire to control39.  The difficulty is to isolate a rational
criterion of shared agreement, on the basis of the mediating value of self-control, because self-control
can exist without being strictly ethical, and also without rational formulation, or without a criterion
taking into account others40. The mediating ethical value of self-control appears to the extent, that an
important part of activities contrary to an ethical existence obey impulsions of the senses, which does
not imply that self-control serves an immediate ethical goal or represents an ethical principle. There
are states of mind where self-control is accompanied by irresponsibility or lower kind of responsibility
and be considered outside the domain of ethical self-control.  In cases of certain mental disorders,
self-control  can  serve  to  execute  an  obsession,  or  be  related  to  the  monotony  of  a  compulsive
disposition. Hartmann shows that “the person who thinks he is a king takes care to protect his dignity,
against any challenge that he is not the king. Likewise, whoever considers his own body to be fragile
as crystal, timidly avoids any free movement”. A neurotic can use his own self-control “to hide his
state from his entourage”. It is on the basis of this observation of ordinary psychology, that Hartmann
demonstrates that there is indeed self-control that serves to inhibit episodes of fantasy, which otherwise
would  lead  to  action,  and  that  part  of  ourselves  determined  by  our  self-control  moderates
representations, that arise quickly to form reasons to act.
38 HARTMANN, Eduard von, “Die Selbstbeherrschung”, PsB, Section 2, A.III.4.5, p. 424.
39 The sole fact of mastering a resistance doesn’t give a virtual moral constraint. Cf. REGINSTER, The Affirmation of Life,
181.
40 HARTMANN, Eduard von, “Die Selbstbeherrschung”, PsB, 425; see also: 426, 436.
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Distinct from these limits, there are also conscious non-ethical goals in an immoral sense (not
amoral), which require great self-control.  If it is crucial to have a talent for simulation, when we are a
person with bad or even criminal intentions, it can be said that nothing is more indispensable, to the
criminal dissimulation, than control of one's self. Reproaching a criminal's lack of self-control  tout
court is  unjustifiable.  Hartmann,  however,  goes  farther  than  a  critique of  basic  comprehension of
responsibility, which believes there is no need for a specific interlocutor in order to be required to
answer for an action41. Without leaving aside the authority to which we would have to answer for an
incorrect action, he compares normative self-control to the result of a psychological process that is
determined by a will that stands out among a set of psychological drives assuming responsibility. It
would be as wrong to ask a “locomotive engineer”, compared with “the strength of a locomotive”,
which is  one “thousand times stronger” than he is,  to  hold it  back by the effort  of his  arms and
shoulders, as to require self-control that the will be strong and sufficient enough, in order to carry out a
positive action immediately,  and to repress all  affects  and passions42.  Since presenting appropriate
“counter motives” suffices, to functions in relation to the unconscious drives of the weakness of will,
like the arms of a locomotive engineer, when he moves a locomotive forward or in reverse, self-control
appears as “a sort of ruse of the conscious will”, in order “to direct the forces of nature, which are
dormant in the spirit”, towards his intentions43.
In contrast to the approach according to which rational agreement about self-control is rational
to the extent that it manifests a high degree of our rationality, ethical productions of the spirit might
well be highly rational and adjust to an immediate and intuitive thought, instead of a self-controlled
reflection44. As a pseudo principle, self-control can serve as an ethics of prudence and also lead to
realization of the morality of a heteronomous authority. That is an insufficient condition for a practice
conception of rules. From the legal point of view, the vehicle of self-control does throw an interesting
light, but that is terrifying in many ways, because of the relationship between an accusation and the
way in which a judge can hold an accused responsible for his incorrect behaviour45. While there are
few ways to learn about the psychological process of a person charged, before he acts. In the absence
of  justification  that  would permit  excusing  the  accused,  a  judge decides  that  the suspected moral
responsibility prevails, on a normative legal level, in cases where it seems that there is no difference
between lack of self-control, related to psychological negligence and a punishable act. As a result,
41 See GARDNER, J. (2003): “The mark of responsibility”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 23, cited in Duff, Answering
for Crime, 25.
42 HARTMANN, Eduard von, “Die Selbstverläugnung”, PsB, 436.
43 PsB, 436.
44 We leave aside the problem of what is considered normal sanity in expressions such as “crazy ( im Wahnsinnigen)”, “our
normal life goals (unsere normalen Lebensziele)”, etc.  See Hartmann, Eduard von, “Die Selbstbeherrschung”,  PsB, 422
and 424 427.‒
45 See PsB, 428.
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beings responsible for their actions suppose a consciousness, developed to such a degree that it can
understand the notions of moral and immoral. A judge makes individuals “responsible only for those
actions which their  consciousness was not prevented from measuring by its  own standard46”.  This
evolution may never arrive by teaching; “for the finest knowledge of ethics is dead knowledge if it
does not act as motive on the will” and “whether it shall do so depends solely on the nature of the
individual  will”.  Conscious self-control  does not  cause a  direct  transformation of  the unconscious
synthesis of the character, which may be modified “by practice and habit”, “through intentional or
accidental partiality of the motives appearing before consciousness47”.
The historical philosophic approach of German idealism, under the influence of Schelling's first
system, leads to the idea of transcendental idealism and the principle of an unconscious Unity48. As a
development of principles of ethical life, a substantial understanding of the notion of responsibility is
based  on  an  axiological  priority  for  Hartmann,  as  a  genealogical  prefiguration  of  the  relational
awareness of human behaviour, through a responsible set of norms. Because a negative eudaemonist
component is central, the set of norms of the responsibility is part of a historical process that could
blurs the substantial element of the criterion49. Should we understand that within a historical process,
the reciprocal agreement on the responsibility of each and every citizen does not make much sense,
because there is only “a ghost” of equality of rights50? The avant-gardist and elitist social model of an
association of egoists, as Stirner explored it, interprets in an social and ethical anarchist way all kinds
of conventional or historical totalities, as “enemies” in a metaphorical sense, because the right of the
personality  and  the  sovereignty  of  the  individuum,  in  Stirner’s  Neohegelian  view is  not  only  an
alternative “culture de la Bohème”, but primarily concerned by our self-education on the path to an
utopic association of individuals. This point of view may be applied on concrete social problems, as
for example the deconstruction of  retaliation and the individual  creation of  new values by seeing
beyond  resentment’s  values51.  The  conditions  which  prevent  individuals  and  societies  from being
“higher beings” are not that they are less unified in a context where they are held together by values,
one  may  think,  but  that  they  are  too  structured  by  conventions  or  reactive  forces  that  aim  at
46 ”Das Unbewusste in Charakter und Sittlichkeit”, 231; transl. 266-267.
47 „Die  Blutrache  wäre  bei  uns  unsittlich,  bei  Völkern  von  geringerer  Kultur  ist  sie  eine  sittliche  Institution“.  ”Das
Unbewusste in Charakter und Sittlichkeit”, 231; transl. 265.
48 See HARTMANN, Eduard von, (1869/1889): “Vorwort zur zehnten Auflage”, Philosophie des Unbewussten, First part,
Leipzig: Verlag von Wilhelm Friedrich, VII.
49 On this line, we find for instance Grossmann’s critique of the Hegelian dialectic interpreted as an antidemocratic process
as deformation of Hegel’s own views found in the Rechtsphilosophie, by a “folkisch-rassistischer Ideologie” dressed in
metaphysical  cloths.  See:  GROSSMANN,  Andreas  (2010):  „Recht  verkehrt.  Hegels  Rechtsphilosophie  im
Neuhegelianismus“,  in:  Recht  ohne  Gerechtigkeit?  Hegel  und  die  Grundlage  des  Rechtsstaates,  Wischke,  Mirko/
Przylebski, Andrzej (Hrsg.), Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 191, 206, 208.
50 This is true for Stirner, see also Hartmann (1898): “Stirners Verherrlichung des Egoismus”, Ethische Studien, III, 80.
51 Cf.  STULPE,  Alexander (2010):  Gesichter  des  Einzigen.  Max  Stirner  und  die  Anatomie  moderner  Individualität,
Beiträge zur Politischen Wissenschaft Band 158, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
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self-preservation. Von Hartmann sees the weight of suffering and interprets in his own way the point
where Schopenhauer arrives, at the end of the fourth book of his great work: the negation of the will of
life is the nothingness. He tries to find a meaningful philosophical project, grand enough to reshape the
mesh of attitudes the affirmation of the will involves, in order to achieve a freedom of the ethics of
injustice, because injustice consists in the negation of a third person’s will. An ethical principle of
redemption should be explored, thinks von Hartmann in the domain of the normativity of criminal
legislation  and justice,  because false  dependences  of  the part  to  the whole  have  to  be  overcome.
Nietzsche was well aware of the universality of the ethical archetype of redemption when he writes:
“the redeeming human being of great love and contempt…in this bell-stroke of noon and of the great
decision, who makes the will free again, who gives back to the earth its goal and to humanity its
hope52”.
3. Transfer of retribution to an entire political community
The dangers of an excessive measure of personal retribution, that of a growth of animosity and
hatred lead to a transfer of retribution to an institution that offers guarantees of fair omissions, and
effective  enforcement  of  penal  measures.  According  to  Hartmann,  this  institution  is  naturally  the
highest authority of the two participating communities, and grows with the development of culture53.
This transfer  can be interpreted in two ways.  First,  a community declares certain torts,  which are
already identified as public torts pre-legally. Instead of constituting interdictions, because reasons to
abstain from killing, robbing or sexually abusing exist, the transfer of retribution to an institution that
offers  guarantees  implies  only  drawing  attention  that  these  torts  concern  the  entire  political
community,  in contrast  to fair  omissions of retribution.  This manner of presenting certain torts  as
clearly public, because criminal torts would be relational by the fact that we can specify the institution
to which we are responsible, recalls a central argument of Duff's legal moralism. A second proposition
on retribution should be presented which has a possible genetic relationship but not logical with the
first.  Since  transfer  of  retribution  should  be  more  successful,  according  to  Hartmann,  through
modifications of customs and an “expansion of basic communities of family and clan to the State54”,
not through a contract, a practical additional condition has to be fulfilled. In order for the proposed
transfer of retribution to function,  citizens must agree on the fact that a procedure formed around
community identity permits the structuring of the idea of a political society for all citizens. If that is the
52 NIETZSCHE,  F.  (1887/1969):  On the Genealogy  of  Morals,  II,  24,  transl.  Kaufmann and Hollingdale.  New York:
Vintage Books.
53 HARTMANN, Eduard von, PSB, “Das Moralprinzip des Gegengefühls”, 201.
54 “Das Moralprinzip des Gegengefühls”, 202.
Criminalization and self-control as “ruse of the conscious will” for Eduard von Hartmann                                                                     137
IGNACE HAAZ
case, an agreement on the contents of the interdictions of that authority goes beyond the conditions
sufficient for transfer55. Hartmann, who puts into perspective the significance of retribution, through
his idea of transfer, seems to argue in favour of the idea that agreement involves less the value of an
interdiction, considered as deserved, than a procedure based on an expansion of the community, in
opposition to hedonistic calculations or to rational contractual agreement. In this case, it could still be
asked whether persons, who cause certain torts deserve to be punished, and not be deprived or tested,
and whether the State should be the recipient of a transfer of communities' retribution, in contrast to
other organizations, which could also produce an appropriate degree of sanction. Hartmann's reply to
these two possible questions departs from legal morality, in the sense that he stresses the political
dimension  of  criminal  justice  on  those  two  levels.  The  transfer  from  a  group  of  communities,
assimilable  to  networks  under  construction  in  civil  society,  towards  a  national  community  passes
logically through the hands of the State, which should have a precise substantial interest56. But we do
not find in Hartmann’s writings that the State's interest in producing criminal justice is in preventing
harm to others.  There is also no reference to a right not to be punished, as a constitutional right,
defined beyond a substantial interest of the State under penal rules57. Hartmann refers to the classic
consequential arguments of a principle of general and specific prevention, without developing notions
of interest and harm that he could have introduced into his analyse of Mill's social eudemonism, which
he  accepts  rather  favourably.  Presented  as  a  lesser  evil,  punishment  can  be  seen  as  justified  in
situations in which the survival of society so requires. This type of reasoning will be associated with
the ideas of a historic movement of realisation of State organism, but remains distinct of the normative
task of explaining the problem of tyrannical paternalism, or just reflecting on unjustifiable costs of
citizenship.
In contrast to a community based procedural approach of retribution, and to the development of
a criterion of public utility, as reflexions on set back of interests associated with the prevention of harm
to others, more than the first half of Hartmann's chapter on the moral principle of counter-sentiment
constitutes bona fide a justification for a moral principle of retribution, with the mention of a possible
basis  in  criminal  law,  as  also  found  in  Kant's  and  Hegel's  writings58.  As  shown  by  Scheler,  the
difference with Hegel is that the requirement for retribution appears negatively in von Hartmann, as
the ineffectiveness of an ethical power to pardon and express gratitude. What does it mean not being a
55 An institutional proceduralism not based  in a community but in a situation of ideal conformity seems less plausible,
because it shows even less concern for substantial norms (prevention of a murder, theft, etc.). See also: DUFF, Answering
for Crime, 87.
56 Expressing  hesitations  to  assign  to  the  State  production  of  penal  sanctions  seems rather  reasonable,  See  HUSAK,
Douglas (2008): Overcriminalization: The limits of the criminal law, New York: Oxford University Press, 204.
57 The absence of external restrictions, for example through constitutional norms, approaches the idea of law as expressed
by Hartmann of legal morality.
58 Ibid. 202.
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positive  ethical  demand  of  retribution59?  As  only  plausible  answer,  Hartmann's  reflections  on
retribution stray from a legal morality that defends the idea that there should be a relational allocation
of responsibility among participants in a civil society, such that this situation were superior when those
responsible for torts are punished, in comparison to that where punishment is omitted.
Male fide, retribution is linked to a theory of emotions that brings out the egoistical character of
a purpose that can become moral, but whose evolution towards a pseudo-moral set of norms is also
possible. The second half of the section on retribution is critical60. On the one hand, various problems
linked to the mode of transfer of a moral obligation are presented by Hartmann. Given that we easily
convince  ourselves  of  having an ethical  understanding of  retribution,  when it  concerns  groups of
persons or broad communities, retributive emotion leads to a collective “justice of lynching”, not to an
appropriate weighing of principles of justice. On the other hand, the comparison between retribution
and development of hatred on a bilateral level, introduces the possibility of extreme perturbations of
emotions  caused  by  provocations.  Clearly  in  favour  of  a  substantial  approach  to  tort  and  penal
retribution based on merit, Hartmann mentions that prophylactic measures of preventive justice against
crimes, not yet committed, are arising from an instinct of retribution of an unconscious reason. This set
of norms includes apparently strictly legal torts, because there is a recursive effect of legality on the
actions, “an influence that is stronger than all religions and moral systems taken together61”. Hartmann
maintains  that  it  is  a  false  approach to  admit,  first,  that  there is  a  content  of  retribution,  without
realising that an unconscious instinct exists, in any source of retribution. This simplified functional
retribution will often deny any historical developments by focussing on its juridical penal dimension,
and the adoption of short-term mechanisms that have a reduced effect over time. Second, there is a
production of effects, not only reduced over time, but also insufficient, when penal end, in the name of
perfection  and  dissuasion,  pose  a  threat,  without  having  to  give  an  ethical  justification  that  is
appropriate  to  the instinct  of  retribution,  by the fact  that  the latter  are  ends separate  from ethical
retribution.
Hartmann conclude his analysis of criminalization and self-control, described as a ruse of the
conscious will by showing the aim of gratitude, as opposed to punitive retribution. From the point of
view of material ethics, we can already perceive an asymmetry between retribution, linked to gratitude
and that caused by suffering, because we can say that a harmful action suggest a remedy, in order to
rebalance the depression of the egoistical feeling caused towards the injured party, while that is not so
59 Scheler, “Das Verhältnis des Zusammenhangs von Glück und sittlichem Werte zur Idee der Sanktion und Vergeltung”,
368.
60 See HARTMANN, Eduard von, “Das Moralprinzip des Gegengefühls”,  208 and 211.  Hartmann mentions Dühring’s
principe  of  vengeance  refusing  to  grant  a  coherence  to  it.  See  also:  DÜHRING,  Eugen  (1865):  “Die  transzendente
Befriedigung der Rache”, Der Wert des Lebens, Breslau: 219 225.‒
61 See “Das Moralprinzip des Gegengefühls”, 205.
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easily acknowledged for a good action. Although retribution is the closest form of remedy, according
to Hartmann, towards which we are instinctively inclined, it is not the only possible remedy in order to
re-establish the level of ethical states of comparable weight. Magnanimity and pardon are perceived as
noble attitudes, while vengeance is considered to be natural.  Retribution redresses a situation to a
lower level, because there was in the meantime a humbling and an imposed restriction. In comparison,
a pardon is a positive act that compensates the negative weight of a crime, towards a balance of ethical
states of comparable weight, in order to reach the status quo ante. While retribution evokes only rarely
the knowledge that penitence is merited, and that a crime can be expiated graciously. It is far closer to
hatred, against the person offering penitence (whether it is a person, a company or the State). On the
contrary, a pardon and the magnanimity of the person that has been harmed can provoke an ethical
shame in the person causing harm, leading to self-awareness and improvement62. Neither retribution
nor  pardon will  have  any effect  against  a  brutal  or  obstinate  person,  who will  see  retribution  as
acquittal of wickedness and hatred, and magnanimity as a weakness.
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